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Uncertainty in the Eurobond Market
E.C. LASHBROOKE, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Eurobond market has existed for nearly twenty years, long
after the circumstances giving rise to its creation ceased to exist. The
outward appearance of the Eurobond market's stability is deceiving,
and there are fears for its continuing viability as a capital market for
United States enterprises.
The Eurobond market is not without risk, and investors fear that
unilateral regulation, primarily by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (Commission), is imminent. Registration of Eurobonds with
the Commission will increase the cost and substantially alter the timing
and flexibility of the issuer in issuing Eurobonds. Moreover, regis-
tration subjects the foreign issuer to the disclosure requirements of
the federal securities laws and to potential financial liability for vi-
olation of these laws.
Favorable tax treatment is critical in the decision to issue
Eurobonds. Currently, entry into the Eurobond market by United
States enterprises is through the Netherlands Antilles which accords
favorable tax treatment to its corporations. The United States-Neth-
erlands Antilles tax treaty' provides for exemption from the with-
holding tax requirements of Sections 1441 and 1442 of the Internal
Revenue Code.2 This exemption is necessary to effectively market
a Eurobond. Investor fears are spurred by the pending renegotiation
of the United States-Netherlands Antilles tax treaty. The Eurobond
market's position vis-6-vis these recent events is the subject of this
article.
S B.A.. 1967; M.A., 1968; J.D., 1972; L.L.M.. 1977. University of Texas, Austin;
Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.
I. Income Tax Convention, Apr. 29, 1948, United States-Netherlands, 62 Stat. 1757,
T.I.A.S. No. 1855. T.D. 5778, 1950-1 C.B. 92, extended to the Netherlands Antilles by
protocol of June 15, 1955, 6 U.S.T. 3696, T.I.A.S. No. 3366, T.D. 6153. 1955-2 C.B.
777, modified and supplemented by protocol of October 23, 1963, 15 U.S.T. 1900, T.I.A.S.
No. 5665, 1965-1 C.B. 624.
2. Id. I.R.C. §§ 1441, 1442 (West 1982).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Post-War History of United States' Role in the
International Capital Market
Following World War II and until 1963, New York City was the
primary international capital market place. Coexistent with the honor
of being the primary international capital market was the concomitant
outflow of United States dollars. In only one year (1957) during the
period from 1950 through 1963 was there a surplus in the United
States' balance-of-payments. 3  During the same period, the highest
deficit in overall balance-of-payments was $3.9 billion, in
1960. 4 These figures alarmed both the Legislative and Executive
Branches.
Of particular concern5 was the increasing investment in foreign
securities by United States residents. 6  New issues of foreign secu-
rities held by United States residents in 1962 totaled almost $1.1
billion and 1963 projections predicted an annual rate of $2 bil-
lion. 7 The increase in sales of foreign securities to United States'
residents in the early 1960s was the combined result of lower interest
rates in the United States relative to most other industrialized countries
and the inability of Western European capital markets to supply the
demands of European businesses.8 Foreign securities were more at-
tractive to United States residents than domestic securities because
the investments' rate of return on foreign securities was higher than
on domestic securities.
Congressional response came in 1964 and was designed to ef-
fectively equalize United States and foreign interest rates. The Interest
Equalization Tax Act of 19639 was enacted in 1964 and was, by its
terms, retroactive to July 19, 1963, the day after the proposal was
submitted to Congress. A temporary excise transfer tax was imposed
on the actual value of debt obligations of a foreign obligor or stock
3. S. REP. No. 1267, 88th Cong.. 2d Sess. (1964). reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3478, 3479.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 3482.
6. A resident is a United States citizen or resident alien. A resident is defined as a
person actually present in the United States who is not a mere transient or sojourner. Treas.
Reg. § 1.871-2(b)(19) (1961).
7. S. REP. No. 1267. supra note 3, at 3482.
8. Id. at 3484.
9. Pub. L. No. 88-563. 78 Stat. 809 (1964), codifiedas I.R.C. §§ 4911-4920. 4931,
6076. 6680, 6681. 7241 (repealed 1976).
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of a foreign issuer acquired from a foreign person.' 0 The maximum
tax rate was fifteen percent and varied primarily depending on the
term of the obligation.'' The rates were determined by adding one
percent to the United States interest rate to determine its equivalent
present value.' 2  In effect, the cost of raising capital in the United
States increased by one percent since a United States taxpayer would
not invest in a foreign security unless the foreign issuer assumed the
burden of the added cost of the tax to the United States taxpayer.
Sales of foreign securities began to fall immediately after the bill' 3
was introduced. 
4
In 1968 President Johnson issued Executive Order 11,387,s which
prohibited transactions involving transfer of capital to or within a
foreign country, or to any foreign national outside the United States
by an owner, subject to United States jurisdiction, of a ten percent
or more interest in voting securities, capital, or earnings of a foreign
business. 16 As a result of Executive Order 11,387, small investors
could still buy foreign securities, but the large block investors, par-
ticularly institutional investors, were shut out of the foreign securities
market. 17
Primarily due to the Interest Equalization Tax Act of 1963, Ex-
ecutive Order 11,387, and the Foreign Direct Investment Regulations 8
issued pursuant to the Executive Order, New York ceased to be an
international capital market. Another source of capital had to be
found. The markets that ultimately developed were the Eurobond
and Eurodollar markets.
B. Eurobonds and Eurodollars as New Sources of
Capital
Under the Marshall Plan following World War II, the United
States pumped immense sums of money into the economies of Western
10. I.R.C. § 4911 (repealed 1976).
11. Id.
12. S. REP. No. 1267, supra note 3, at 3485.
13. H.R. 8000, 88th Cong. Ist Sess. 110 CONG. REC. 4515-23 (1964).
14. The bill was introduced in the House in August, 1963. "In the third quarter of
1963 [August, September, and October] . . . net purchases of foreign stocks and bonds
resultled] in a favorable balance of $51 million." H.R. 1046, 88th Cong., ist Sess. 6
(1963).
15. 33 Fed. Reg. 47 (1968) revoked, 39 Fed. Reg. 86,481 (1974)).
16. Id.
17. The importance of this is seen when considering that institutions account for the
placement of 80% of Eurodollar bonds. The Eurobond Market, THE ECONOMIST. Nov. 18,
1978, at 114, col. 3.
18. 15 C.F.R. §§ 1000-1050 (1974).
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industrialized nations.' 9 The goal of the Marshall Plan was to res-
urrect the devastated economies of non-communist countries and to
prevent their collapse and loss to communism. This pool of United
States dollars, added to trade deficits, created the overseas reserves
of United States dollars which became the Eurodollar and Eurobond
markets.
In the post-war period from 1949 to 1962, the annual deficit in
overall balance-of-payments never exceeded $4 billion. 20  From 1952
through 1973 United States oil imports ranged from $.69 billion (c.i.f.)
to $7.55 billion (c.i.f.). 2' After the Arab oil embargo of 1973, spec-
tacular growth in the Eurodollar and Eurobond markets occurred. In
1974, the value of oil imports jumped to $26.12 billion (c.i.f.) and
increased until 1981 when the value was $79.70 billion
(c.i.f.). 22  These petrodollars inflated the pool of United Stated dol-
lars available to the Eurodollar and Eurobond markets.
C. The History of the Eurodollar
Essentially, a Eurodollar is any deposit of United States' dollars
in a banking institution outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States. The banking institution may be either a foreign bank or an
overseas branch of a United States bank. The growth of the Eurodollar
and Eurobond markets caused the explosion of overseas branches of
United States banks in the early 1970's.23
United States banking policy decisions forced United States banks
to open foreign branch offices. Federal Reserve Board Regulation Q
prohibited interest payments on demand deposits, and limited the
interest rate on time deposits. 24  As a result of Regulation Q, the
interest rate obtainable in the United States is lower than the Eurobond
interest rate. 25  In addition, foreign branches of United States banks
are not subject to the reserve requirements of the Federal Reserve
19. The Marshall Plan or European Recovery Program was first outlined in a com-
mencement address on June 5, 1947 by Secretary of State George C. Marshall. Legislation
establishing the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) was enacted in 1948. During
the tenure of the ECA (1948-52) over $12 billion was dispensed under the Marshall Plan.
20. S. REP. No. 1267, supra note 3, at 3479.
21. International Financial Statistics, 11982] INT'L MONETARY FUND Y.B. 466-67.
22. Id.
23. See International Financial Statistics, [1982] INT'L MONETARY FUND Y.B.
24. 12 C.F.R. §§ 217.3, 217.4 (1983).
25. See International Financial Statistics. [1982] INT'L MONETARY FUND Y.B. 56, for
a comparison of interest rates between the United States and the London Eurobond market.
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Board. 26  None of the deposits of foreign branches need be idle.
A Eurodollar transaction is a loan made outside the United States
and repaid by the debtor outside the United States. Long term loan
transactions in which unsecured corporate notes are issued constitute
the Eurobond market. Because the Eurobond market is truly inter-
national and not unilaterally regulated, the terms and conditions under
which the loan is made and the bonds are issued are nearly uni-
form. 27  Uniformity is the result of the issuers' collective need for
certainty and security in a crazy quilt of national law and interests.
D. The History of Eurobonds
A Eurobond is comparable to a note or bond issued in the United
States. The typical Eurobond is a European-style bearer instrument
generally in denominations of $1000.2 8 Investors prefer bearer in-
struments to protect anonymity and to facilitate transfer. 29
Because the note or bond is a security,30 United States based
corporations cannot directly issue the Eurobonds without registration
under the provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 (33 Act). 31  To
avoid registration, United States based corporations create foreign
finance subsidiaries which issue the notes or bonds. 32  To facilitate
their sale, the United States based parent corporation may guarantee
the bonds. The proceeds from the sale of the Eurobonds are, in turn,
26. Section 7, International Banking Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. § 3105; 12 C.F.R. §
204.9(a)(2) (1983).
27. See Horn, A Uniform Approach to Eurobond Agreements, 9 LAW & POLY IN
INT'L Bus. 753, 756-57 (1977).
28. Bross, The United States Borrower in the Eurobond Market - A Lawyer's Point
of View, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 172, 181 (1969).
29. Id. Anonymity works both ways. The issuer may prefer that the purpose of the
issue remain undisclosed. For example, an issuer arranging financing for an attempted
merger or takeover may utilize the Eurobond market rather than domestic financing where
use of the proceeds must be disclosed in Item 3, form S-I registration statement. Id. at
176-77; 17 C.F.R. § 239.11 (1983). On the other hand the purchaser may prefer to remain
anonymous particularly if the purchaser wants to avoid municipal law. OPEC leaders seem
to prefer being secretive about their investments.
The Treasury is hostile to bearer form obligations. If interest is attributable to certain
obligations in bearer form the interest deduction may be denied. I.R.C. § 164(f)(19) (West
1978). A loss sustained on bearer form obligations may not be deductible. I.R.C. §
165(j)(19) (West Supp. 1983). Gain on sale or exchange of a bearer form obligation may
be treated as ordinary income. I.R.C. § 1232(c) (West 1982).
30. The Securities Act of 1933 defines a security as "any note, .... bond, debenture,
evidence of indebtedness, . . . or. . . guarantee of, .... any of the foregoing." Securities
Act of 1933, § 2(l), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1981).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1976).
32. Bross, supra note 28, at 188.
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loaned by the foreign subsidiary to the parent corporation.
The Eurobond market has grown primarily because it avoids
contact with United States securities laws while directly competing
with the United States capital markets for investment dollars. Eu-
robonds have an advantage over United States securities because the
bonds may be issued in response to need without registration delays
and, as a result, may be less expensive. Other factors which have
contributed to the growth of the Eurobond market are the more fa-
vorable interest rate, corporate guarantee, the anonymity and liquidity
of bearer type instruments, and the favorable tax treatment.
The Eurobond market, however, is not without risk. Wide fluc-
tuations in Eurocurrency might cause the market to operate erratically
and create a credit crunch. The oil glut and decreased consumption
of petroleum products are drying up OPEC petrodollars which con-
stitute a major source of available dollars to buy Eurobonds. 3
III. UNITED STATES REGULATION OF FOREIGN ISSUED
SECURITIES
A. Registration of Eurobonds
In the absence of a statutory exemption, 3 Eurobonds are secu-
rities which require registration pursuant to the 33 Act 5.31 Since the
Commission has taken the position that the Securities Acts were de-
signed to protect United States citizens and residents, 36 registration
of Eurobond issues is not required, provided that the Eurobonds are
offered outside the United States only to non-nationals of the United
States and Canada, and as long as the distribution is effected in a
manner which would result in the securities coming to rest outside
the United States. 37  Since 1964, Eurobond issues have been offered
outside the United States in reliance on Securities Act Release No.
33. AIm, It Might Help Now, But in Time ... N.Y. Times. Dec. 12. 1982, § F, at
2. col. 3: Lichtblau, OPEC's Humbling Could Be a Problem. N.Y. Times. Dec. 12. 1982.
§ F. at 2. col. 5.
34. Some of these exemptions are found in 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1976 & Supp. 1981).
Exempted transactions are found in 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1976 & Supp. 1981).
35. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77mm (1976 & Supp. 1981).
36. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4708 (July 9. 1964). 29 Fed. Reg. 9828 (1964),
reprinted in I FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1361-63. at 2124.
37. Id.
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4708.38 To comply with the release, underwriting agreements gen-
erally provide for a ninety day lock-up to prevent the securities from
coming to rest in the United States for at least the initial ninety day
period.39
No-action letters issued by the Commission do not offer opinions
with respect to resales in the United States after the expiration of the
ninety day period but are limited to the initial distribution outside the
United States.40  However, the Commission states that reoffers and
resales must be made in compliance with the registration requirements
of the Securities Act.4' The end result is that registration is required
unless an exemption is available.
Currently, a registration exemption is available to foreign issuers
who involuntarily enter the United States market. 42  However, the
Commission has proposed eliminating this exemption. 43  Rule
12g3-24 4 allows these foreign securities to be traded over-the-counter
and quoted on the NASDAQ listing.4 5  The proposed amendments
would treat the NASDAQ listing as a voluntary entry into the United
States market so that foreign issuers with NASDAQ quoted securities
would not be involuntary participants in the United States market and
would, therefore, not be exempt from registration requirements. 46
38. See, e.g., Intercontinental Hotels Corp., no-action letter (dated July 12, 1971),
reprinted in [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 78,370; The Singer
Co., no-action letter (dated Sept. 3, 1974), reprinted in [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. 79,979.
39. See, e.g., The Singer Co., letter of inquiry (dated July 25, 1974), reprinted in
11974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,979 at 84,516-19.
40. A "no-action" letter is a Securities and Exchange Commission staff reply to an
inquiry that, based on the facts supplied, the staff will not recommend that action be taken
by the Commission. See, e.g., The Singer Co., supra note 39, at 84,515.
41. Id.
42. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6433 (Oct. 28, 1982) and SEC Securities Ex-
change Act Release No. 19,187 (Oct. 28, 1982), reprinted in [1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 83,272. Under Rule 12g3-2, a foreign issuer could encourage a
secondary market through the NASDAQ system without registration or disclosure. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240. 12g3-2 (1982).
43. Under the proposed amendments foreign issuers whose securities are listed on
NASDAQ must comply with an annual disclosure requirement. The "pink sheet" market
or National Daily Quotation Sheets remains available to foreign issuers without registration
or annual disclosure. Id.
44. Id.
45. National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation system provides
current quotations for many over-the-counter securities.
46. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6433 and SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 19,187, supra note 42.
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Convertible Eurobonds issued by foreign finance subsidiaries of
United States domestic corporations create additional problems. While
the Eurobond itself need not be registered under current Commission
practice, the underlying security of the United States corporation must
be registered. 47  Section 3(a)(9) 48 of the 33 Act, which provides an
exemption for securities exchanged by an issuer with its existing
security holders, does not provide the United States corporation with
an exemption here because the convertible Eurobonds are issued by
the foreign finance subsidiary and not the United States parent cor-
poration, which merely guarantees the Eurobond. Therefore, it is not
an exchange of securities by an issuer with its existing shareholders.
If the Commission should change its position taken in the no-
action letters and require registration, or should it finally decide to
require secondary distribution registration, the issuer, underwriters
and sellers would be in violation of section 549 of the 33 Act. Such
a change in position would seriously impede the flow of international
capital into the United States because of the increased cost of regis-
tration, increased lead time required to obtain Commission approval,
the reluctance of foreign issuers to disclose sensitive information in
public registration materials and exposure to the potential financial
liability for misstatements or omissions in the registration materials
and selling documents.
Foreign issuers may easily register their securities by filing the
appropriate form.50  Forms F-1 ,5 F-2 5 2 and F-3 53 for foreign private
47. SEC Form F-I, 47 Fed. Reg. 54,771, 54,772 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 239.31).
48. 15 U.S.C. § 77(c)(a)(9) (1981).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1976).
50. In 1982, the Commission modified forms S-1, S-2 and S-3. 17 C.F.R. § 239.13
(1982), in SEC Securities Act Release No. 6383 (May 24, 1982), 47 Fed. Reg. 11,380
(1982) and created forms F-I, F-2 and F-3, 47 Fed. Reg. 54,771-79 (1982), for use of
foreign private issuers in SEC Securities Act Release No. 6437 (Dec. 4, 1982), and SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 19,258 (Dec. 4, 1982), 47 Fed. Reg. 54,764 (1982).
51. SEC Form F-I, 47 Fed. Reg. 54,771 (1982), 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 6038D.
Form F-I must be used by foreign private issuers for all offers including exchange offers
except for those which qualify to use form F-2 or F-3. Form F- I requires the greatest degree
of disclosure of the three forms because of the foreign private issuer's lack of contact with
the United States reporting systems. Form F-1 must be used by foreign private issuers (1)
who are "world class" issuers (issuers having an aggregate market value of voting stock
held by non-affiliates worldwide of at least $300 million) or who are making a shareholder
offering and who have not reported under section 12 (15 U.S.C. § 781 (1981)), section 13
(15 U.S.C. § 78m (1981)), section 14 (15 U.S.C. § 78n (1981)), or section 15(d) (15 U.S.C.
§ 78o(d) (1981)) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (34 Act) for the thirty-six month
period immediately preceeding the filing of the form F- I and who have not filed an annual
report pursuant to Rule 12b-25(b) (17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-25(b) (1983)), and (2) who are
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issuers parallel forms S-1,14 S-251 and 5-3,56 which are required for
United States issuers. In order to use the F-series forms, the foreign
private issuer must be eligible to file or have filed a Form
20-F.57  United States parent corporations and their wholly-owned
foreign finance subsidiaries may not use form F-i, F-2 or F-3 to
register securities for sale in the United States but must use form
S-1, S-2 or S-3.8
making other offerings and who have not filed reports pursuant to sections 12, 13, 14 or
15(d) of the 34 Act for the thirty-six month period immediately preceeding the filing of F-
1. Form F-I must be used by a foreign private issuer eligible to use an SEC Form 20-F but
for which no other form is prescribed. Form F- I requires financial information substantially
the same as that required of domestic corporations which includes use of United States
accounting standards and techniques in preparing and presenting the financial data. The
increased reporting requirement of Form F-I seems to be an extension of the Commission's
preoccupation with the stilted disclosure forms of the past primarily designed to protect the
individual investor. Eurobond issues resold in the United States would be directed primarily
at the institutional investor who has the means to acquire relevant information before making
the purchase.
52. SEC Form F-2, 47 Fed. Reg. 54,773 (1982), 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 6038E.
Form F-2 may be used by a foreign private issuer who has a class of securities registered
under section 12(b) of the 34 Act or a class of equity securities registered under section
12(g) of the 34 Act or is required to file reports under section 15(d) of the 34 Act and is
eligible to file and has filed annual reports on form 20-F; provided, the foreign private issuer
is a "world class" issuer who has filed at least the latest form 20-F required to have been
filed and the securities are only offered to existing shareholders. Other offerings by a non
"world class" issuer may be registered on form F-2 only if the issuer has filed reports
pursuant to sections 13, 14 or 15(d) of the 34 Act for the thirty-six month period immediately
preceeding the filing of form F-2. Because of the reporting requirements for use of the form
F-2 it is an intermediate disclosure form requiring less disclosure than form F-1 where the
issuer has no reporting history.
53. SEC Form F-3, 47 Fed. Reg. 54,776 (1982), 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 6038F.
Form F-3 is the minimal disclosure form for foreign private issuers. Form F-3 is primarily
to be used by "world class" issuers who have met the thirty-six month and annual reporting
requirements. The world class issuer requirement is imposed on transactions involving
secondary offerings; however, the world class issuer requirement does not apply to offerings
of non-convertible "investment grade" debt securities offered for cash. An investment grade
debt security is a non-convertible debt security having at least one nationally recognized
statistical rating organization rate the security in one of its generic rating categories that
signifies investment grade. Form F-3 could be used to issue non-convertible Eurobonds if
the foreign private issuer has met the thirty-six month and annual reporting requirements.
54. SEC Form S-1, 17 C.F.R. § 239.11 (1983).
55. SEC Form S-2, 17 C.F.R. § 239.12 (1983).
56. SEC Form S-3, 17 C.F.R. § 239.13 (1983).
57. 17 C.F.R. §§ 239.31-239.33 (1983).
58. A foreign private issuer may not use SEC Form 20-F if more than fifty percent
of its outstanding securities are held, directly or indirectly, by United States residents and
its business is administered principally in the United States or fifty percent or more of the
members of the Board of Directors are residents of the United States. 17 C.F.R. § 249.220f
(1982). Most foreign finance subsidiaries of United States corporations fall within this
category.
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United States corporations issuing Eurobonds through foreign
finance subsidiaries may not use form F-I, F-2 or F-3 but must use
form S-1, S-2 or S-3 even though the bonds are issued by a foreign
corporation. 59 Additionally, the domestic parent corporation's guar-
antee is a security which must be concurrently registered.
60
Corresponding to form F-3 is form S-3, which may be used to
register non-convertible, investment grade debt securities. The
Eurobonds issued by the foreign finance subsidiary and the parent-
guarantee may both be registered on form S-3 if the parent meets the
appropriate rating and reporting requirements. 61 The reporting re-
quirements are the same thirty-six month and annual report require-
ments as for form F-3. 62 If the foreign finance subsidiary cannot
meet the reporting requirements it is sufficient that requirements are
met by the United States parent corporation. 63 The issue may still
be registered on form S-3 even for non-investment grade securities if
the aggregate market value of the voting stock of the domestic parent
held by non-affiliates is at least $150 million or at least $100 million
and has an annual trading volume of at least three million shares.
64
Since registration of Eurobond issues either by foreign private
issuers on form F-3, or by foreign finance subsidiaries with domestic
parent guarantees, is relatively easy to obtain, it is surprising that
more issuers do not take advantage of it. A partial answer may be
that even simplified registration takes time which would detract from
the Eurobond market's potential for flexibility and quick reaction time.
More importantly, registration brings foreign nationals into contact
with the Securities and Exchange Commission and registration carries
with it liabilities. The foreign underwriting groups would be particu-
larly wary of section 1165 of the 33 Act and possible deficiencies of
the indenture trust under the Trust Indenture Act of 1939.66
B. Potential Problems with Trust Indentures
As long as the Commission maintains its no-action stance on
registration of Eurobonds, the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 does not
59. 17 C.F.R. § 249.220f (1982).
60. See supra note 30.
61. 17 C.F.R. § 239.13(c) (1983).
62. 17 C.F.R. § 239.13(a)(3) (1983).
63. 17 C.F.R. § 239.13(c)(2) (1983).
64. 17 C.F.R. § 239.13(b)(1) (1983).
65. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976).
66. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1976).
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pose any problems. However, should registration be required in the
future, Trust Indenture Act provisions will become applicable, causing
serious problems. Although a security may be registered under the
Securities Act of 1933, it may not be offered for sale unless the trust
indenture complies with the Trust Indenture Act of 1939.67
The Trust Indenture Act applies to issues of bonds, debentures,
notes, and similar debt securities issued under a trust indenture if
more than $10 million of the securities is outstanding at any one
time. 68 The Act requires that the trustee be a corporation having
minimum combined capital and surplus 69 and, in the event of default
by the issuer, to exercise the rights, powers, and duties vested in it
as a prudent person would in the conduct of their own affairs.70
Nothing in British or civil law jurisdictions is comparable to the
Trust Indenture Act. While it is common in the United Kingdom to
draft a "trust deed," the thrust of the British regulatory scheme,
which requires the indenture trustee to exercise a high degree of care,
is different from that of the United States.
7
1
The viability of all indenture trusts under civil law has been
called into question as a result of the Four Seasons72 case in which
a Luxembourg court refused to recognize an indenture trust because
article 88 of the Luxembourg company law, an exhaustive enumer-
ation of bond holder's rights, 73 did not include authorization for the
trustee to pursue bondholder claims.
To prevent the loss of its Eurobond market, Luxembourg has
since amended its law to allow use of an indenture trust;74 however,
the validity of indenture trusts in other civil law jurisdictions is highly
suspect and presents another potential crisis for the Eurobond market.
Issuers in civil law jurisdictions routinely execute trust deeds or in-
dentures, and banks and other financial institutions in civil law ju-
67. 15 U.S.C. § 77eee(b) (1976).
68. 15 U.S.C. § 77ddd(a) (1981).
69. 15 U.S.C. § 77jjj (1981).
70. 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(c) (1981).
71. See 7 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND. para. 816 (4th ed. 1974). British regulation
consists of section 88 of the Companies Act of 1948 which prohibits indemnity provisions
and trustee immunization clauses. Companies Act, I I & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 38 (1948).
72. Four Seasons Overseas N.V. v. S.A. Finimtrust, Jan. 21, 1971, Tribunal
d'arrondissement, Lux., 62 REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVIE [R.C.D.!.P.]
51 (1973).
73. Id. at 54-55.
74. Arrft6 du grand-ducal dv 22 decembre 1972 concernant la reprdsentation fidu-
ciaire, MEMORIAL [Off. Gaz.j Dec. 29. 1972, at 2113 (Lux.).
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risdictions routinely serve as trustees.75 They do so knowing that
bondholders' rights are determined solely by reference to the com-
mercial code of the jurisdiction in question. The crisis has been
avoided so far by inserting choice-of-law clauses and other provisions
into the underwriting agreements. 76
Most Eurobond underwriting agreements are written in the "firm
commitment" style. 77  The underwriting banks purchase the bonds
with the intention to resell to investors. The issuer assumes no re-
sponsibility for the qualification of the securities in any specific ju-
risdiction. The underwriters and sellers are responsible for compli-
ance with local law. Hence, the underwriters and sellers are
contractually responsible under the underwriting agreement for vio-
lations of United States securities laws. 78  All Eurobond underwriting
agreements contain covenants to preclude any sales to United States
nationals and covenants to preclude any sales in the United States,
regardless of the purchaser's nationality, for at least ninety days fol-
lowing the completion of the distribution. 79  Confirmations of sales
through dealers not in the selling group ° contain a similar statement
on non-sales. 8' The underwriters are protected by a force majeare
clause which gives them the right to terminate the underwriting agree-
ment before closing if the issue would be prejudiced by a substantial
change in national or international financial, political or economic
conditions. 82  Any change in status by the Commission would trigger
the force majeare clauses of all agreements not yet closed.
If registration materials are filed for distribution within the United
States, the issuer, underwriters and sellers are liable under section
11 3 of the 33 Act for omitting material facts or making false statements
75. Oppetit, Le 'trust" dans le droit du commerce international, 62 R.C.D.I.P. I,
7 (1973).
76. The underwriting agreements tend to be remarkably uniform. For a discussion
of the problem of bondholder representation, see Note, International Debt Obligations of
Enterprises in Civil Law Countries: The Problem of Bondholder Representation, 21 VA.
J. INT'L L. 269 (1981).
77. The underwriters are principals rather than agents who assume the risk that the
issue cannot be placed.
78. See Horn, supra note 27, at 761.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 39-41.
80. The selling group consists of the lead underwriter and other underwriters, primarily
banks and other financial institutions, and dealers invited to join the syndicate.
81. See supra text accompanying notes 39-41.
82. See Horn, supra note 27, at 758-59.
83. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1981). Section II provides in part that:
(a) In case any part of the registration statement, when such part became effective,
contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact
342 [Vol. 6:331
1983] Eurobond Market 343
in the registration statement. The potential for liability is increased
because disclosure and accepted accounting principles differ from
country to country. For example, the Item 17 and 18 financial state-
ments included in form 20-F do not have to comply with Commission-
approved, and generally accepted, accounting principles or Regulation
S-X;84 however, the certified statements and format of the financial
statements must be the same as for United States issuers.85 The Item
18 alternative of form 20-F is more extensive in its financial disclosure
and more like the requirements of Regulation S-X. The importance
of the higher disclosure standard for Item 18 is that this alternative
is required for form 20-F for the year immediately preceeding the
filing of a form F-2 or F-3. If non-approved but generally accepted
accounting principles are used in form 20-F, statements must be in-
cluded setting forth material deviations from the Commission's gen-
erally accepted accounting principles.8 6  Likewise, the balance sheet
must be annotated to show any such variations.87 The result of these
requirements is that form 20-F must be completed with the same
information required from United States issuers directly, or supple-
mented with such information.
Section 11 liability may also arise out of omissions or false
statements contained in the explanations of deviations from United
States approved generally accepted accounting principles. 88 The cost
required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not
misleading, any person acquiring such security (unless it is proved that at the time
of such acquisition he knew of such untruth or omission) may, either at law or in
equity, in any court of competent jurisdiction, sue-
(I) every person who signed the registration statement;
(2) every person who was a director of (or person performing similar functions) or
partner in the issuer at the time of the filing of the part of the registration statement with
respect to which his liability is asserted;
(3) every person who, with his consent, is named in the registration statement as being
or about to become a director, person performing similar functions, or partner;
(4) every accountant, engineer, or appraiser, or any person whose profession gives
authority to a statement made by him, who has with his consent been named as having
prepared or certified any part of the registration, or as having prepared or certified any report
or valuation which is used in connection with the registration statement, with respect to the
statement in such registration statement, report, or valuation, which purports to have been
prepared or certified by him;
(5) every underwriter with respect to such security.
84. 17 C.F.R. § 210.04-01(a)(2) (1983).
85. Proposed § 3-19(a), Reg. S-X, Sec. Act. Rel. No. 6361, 11981-1982] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 83,055.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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of compliance by foreign private issuers, coupled with potential sec-
tion 11 liability, will result in foreign private issuers not registering
Eurobond issues in the United States.
C. Potential Problems with Extraterritorial Application
of United States Law
Continued reliance on the Commission's no-action stance and
nonregistration does not mean that issuers, underwriters and sellers
are immune from liability under the securities laws. Multitudes of
articles have been written on the extraterritorial application of United
States securities laws.89 Both the 33 and 34 Acts include in the
definition of "interstate commerce" transactions between a foreign
country and any state, territory or District of Columbia. 90 Federal
courts have applied the antifraud provisions of the Acts
extraterritorially. 91
Extraterritorial application of the antifraud provisions appears to
be expanding, and may indeed be codified in section 1905 of the
proposed Federal Securities Code. 92. Potential liability under United
States securities laws hangs like a sword over the heads of issuers,
underwriters and sellers of Eurobonds. Intrusion of United States
regulatory power into the Eurobond market would have catastrophic
effects on the ability of United States businesses to raise capital and
on the free flow of international capital and trade.
IV. TAX IMPACT AS A DETERMINING FACTOR FOR
ISSUANCE
An essential element in successful marketing of a Eurobond issue
is that the issuer must be able to pay interest without a withholding
tax requirement. A Eurobond issue in which the issuer must withhold
taxes on interest payable is simply not marketable, because the interest
89. See, e.g., Becker. Extraterritorial Dimensions of the Securities Exchange Act. 2
N.Y. U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 233 (1969); Curtis, The Extraterritorial Application of the Federal
Securities Code: A Further Analysis, 9 CONN. L. REV. 67 (1976): Leigh. Jurisdiction:
Extraterritorial Application of United States Securities Laws. 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 960 (1981):
Norton, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of U.S. Antitrust and Securities Laws, 28 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 575 (1979).
90. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(7) (1976). 15 U.S.C. § 78c(17) (1976).
91. See, e.g., lIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980); Bersch v. Drexel Fire-
stone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018; Leasco Data Processing
Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook.
405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968) reh'g en banc., 405 F.2d 215, cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906.
92. American Law Institute, Proposed Federal Securities Code: (Proposed Official
Draft 722-31) (May 19, 1978).
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withholding tax must be borne by the issuer, making the issue too
expensive. Furthermore, prospective bondholders want to remain
outside national income and estate tax jurisdiction. Issuers want to
benefit from a deduction for interest payments 93 or otherwise, mini-
mize the tax .consequences of an issue.
United States corporate Eurobond issuers were initially faced
with sections 1441 and 1442 of the Internal Revenue Code94 which
provide for a withholding tax on interest paid from United States
sources to nonresident alien individuals or foreign partnerships or
corporations95 of thirty percent.9 6  In order to avoid the withholding
requirements of sections 1441 and 1442, United States domestic cor-
porations established offshore finance subsidiaries, some of which
became Eurobond issuers. The offshore finance subsidiaries escaped
the withholding requirement if less than twenty percent of their gross
income was derived from United States sources. 97
Prior to the expiration of the Interest Equalization Tax on June
30, 1974, an offshore finance subsidiary was exempt from the with-
holding requirements of sections 1441 and 1442 if the finance sub-
sidiary had a five-to-one debt-equity ratio. 98 Another consequence
of the five-to-one debt-equity ratio was that the finance subsidiary's
debt was deemed to be its own and not that of its parent; therefore,
the Interest Equalization Tax did not apply to the offshore finance
subsidiary. 99 When the Interest Equalization Tax expired so did the
five-to-one debt-equity safe harbor from the withholding requirements
of sections 1441 and 1442.100 Revenue Rulings 74-464 and 74-620
93. I.R.C. § 163 (West 1982 & Supp. 1983). However, the deduction for interest
paid on certain obligations in bearer form may be denied. If the obligation is a **registration-
required obligation" no interest deduction is allowed unless the obligation is registered under
the provisions of the Securities Act of 1933. An obligation is exempt from registration and
its interest is deductible if: ( I ) the interest is not payable in the United States or one of its
possessions; (2) the obligation on its face states that any United States person who holds the
obligation will be subject to limitations under United States tax laws; and (3) arrangements
are made not to sell the obligation to United States persons. I.R.C. § 163(f) (West Supp.
1983).
94. I.R.C. §§ 1441-1442 (West Supp. 1982).
95. I.R.C. § 861 (West 1982).
96. I.R.C. §§ 1441-1442 (West 1982); I.R.C. § 871(a)(I)(A): I.R.C. § 881(a)(1)
(West 1982).
97. See Rev. Rul. 69-377. 1969-2 C.B. 231, 233.
98. Rev. Rul. 69-377, 1969-2 C.B. 231, 233: Rev. Rul. 69-501. 1969-2 C.B. 233,
234 (revoked in 1974).
99. Id.
100. Rev. Rul. 74-464. 1974-2 C.B. 46. 47; Rev. Rul. 74-620. 1974-2 C.B. 380.
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held that there was no reason to treat offshore finance subsidiaries
differently from other corporations with respect to their corporate
validity or their indebtedness.'°' The interest withholding tax was
reimposed on both the domestic parent and offshore finance subsidiary
unless reduced or waived by a tax treaty.' 02
The withholding tax may be imposed on the domestic parent
either because the Eurobonds are deemed to be the parent's obliga-
tions, or because the parent borrowed the Eurobond issue proceeds
from the offshore finance subsidiary and paid interest to the finance
subsidiary. In the case of the former, the expiration of the five-to-
one debt-equity safe harbor means that there is no articulated standard
by which to determine whether the Eurobond issue constitutes debt
of the offshore finance subsidiary or of the domestic parent corpo-
ration. Debt-equity ratios are no longer determinative; however, ex-
perience has shown that, as a rule of thumb, a two and one-half-to-
one debt-equity ratio is acceptable. 03 The subsidiary must strictly
adhere to corporate formalities and adequate capitalization to have its
separate existence honored. ,04 If, however, the debt is deemed to
be the domestic parent's, only a favorable tax treaty can save the
parent corporation from the withholding tax requirement.
One such favorable treaty is the income tax treaty between the
United States and the Kingdom of the Netherlands,'05 ratified in 1948.
When the Netherlands Antilles became autonomous in 1954, those
benefits, with certain limitations, were extended by protocol to the
Netherlands Antilles in 1955.106 By extending the Netherlands treaty
to include the Netherlands Antilles, that country has flourished as a
Caribbean tax haven and has become a mecca for thousands of foreign
101. Id.
102. Under article 6. clause 2 of the United States Constitution. treaties to which the
United States is a party have a status that is coequal with United States statutes. Internal
Revenue Code Section 7852(d) provides that the code cannot abrogate any treaty in effect
on August 16, 1954. The United States-Netherlands treaty was ratified in 1948, see supra
note 1.
103. Newburg, Financing in the Euromarket by U.S. Companies: A Survey of the Legal
and Regulatory Framework, 33 Bus. LAW. 2171, 2192 (1978).
104. Id.
105. Income Tax Convention, Apr. 29, 1948, United States-Netherlands, 62 Stat. 1757,
T.I.A.S. No. 1855, T.D. 5778, 1950-1 C.B. 92.
106. Protocol Respecting Double Taxation: Income. June 15. 1955. United States-
Netherlands, 6 U.S.T. 3696, T.I.A.S. No. 3366, T.D. 6153, 1955-2 C.B. 777. Subse-
quently modified by Protocol Respecting Double Taxation on Income, Oct. 23, 1963. United
States-Netherlands, 15 U.S.T. 1900, T.I.A.S. No. 5665. 1965-1 C.B. 624.
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companies seeking to take advantage of the favorable tax climate. 0 7
Offshore finance subsidiaries of United States domestic corpo-
rations inhabit the safe tax harbor of the Netherlands Antilles because
of the United States-Netherlands Antilles tax treaty and the Nether-
lands Antilles municipal tax law. There are no withholding taxes on
interest paid by a Netherlands Antilles corporation, nor any income
tax on interest paid to nonresidents of the Netherlands
Antilles. °8 Interest paid by a Netherlands Antilles corporation is
exempt from United States tax unless the recipient is a citizen, resident
or corporation of the United States. 0 9 Since sales of Eurobonds to
United States citizens, residents or corporations are initially prohibited
by the underwriting agreements, no United States tax liability arises
until a United States resident, citizen or corporation acquires a
Eurobond.
The Treasury Department has not been particularly happy with
the United States-Netherlands Antilles tax treaty. The 1955 Protocol,
which extended the Netherlands treaty to the Netherlands Antilles,
was modified in 1963 to stop nationals of countries not a party to the
treaty from taking advantage of the tax benefits. This modification
stopped nationals of countries not party to the treaty from taking
advantage of the treaty's tax benefits by establishing residency in the
Netherlands Antilles either directly, through corporate subsidiaries,
or indirectly, through holding companies which invest in either United
States real property or in other investments.' 0
In 1971, the Internal Revenue Service issued Treasury Regulation
Section 1. 1441-6 which required the withholding agent for interest
paid withhold the tax at the reduced rate (as provided by an applicable
treaty) rather than the thirty or fourteen percent otherwise re-
107. Fialka, Closing a Loophole, Wall St. J., Oct. II, 1982, at I. col. 6.
108. Protocol Respecting Double Taxation: Income, June 15. 1955, United States-
Netherlands. art. XII. 6 U.S.T. 3696. T.I.A.S. No. 3366, T.D. 6153. 1955-2 C.B. 777.
Subsequently modified by Protocol Respecting Double Taxation on Income. Oct. 23, 1963,
United States-Netherlands, 15 U.S.T. 1900. T.I.A.S. No. 5665. 1965-1 C.B. 624 (this treaty
incorporates the Income Tax Convention. Apr. 29. 1948, United States-Netherlands. 62
Stat. 1757, T.I.A.S. No. 1855, T.D. 5778, 1950-1 C.B. 92). A minimal tax of a maximum
of three percent is imposed on Netherlands Antilles holding companies. Arts. XIII and XIV,
Netherlands Antilles National Ordinance on Profit Tax of 1940.
109. Protocol Respecting Double Taxation: Income, June 15. 1955. United States-
Netherlands, arts. VII and XII, 6 U.S.T. 3696, T.I.A.S. No. 3366, T.D. 6153, 1955-2 C.B.
777.
l10. 1965-1 C.B. 624.
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quired.' I The regulation's effect is that no withholding is required
on interest paid to a Netherlands Antilles corporation; therefore, the
interest paid by a United States parent corporation to its Netherlands
Antilles finance subsidiary is tax free. This tax relief is a necessary
condition for the issuance of the Eurobonds.
If part of a Eurobond issue ultimately comes into the hands of
persons subject to United States tax jurisdiction, the interest paid by
a Netherlands Antilles corporation is not exempt from United States
taxation." 2  However, the tax is easily avoided, because the IRS
cannot identify Eurobond holders subject to the United States tax
jurisdiction. In an effort to police the treaty provisions, the Treasury
Department issued Revenue Procedure 79-40.' '3 Revenue Procedure
79-40 provides that the thirty percent withholding tax is applicable to
interest paid to a Netherlands Antilles corporation unless the with-
holding agent receives a certificate of status from the Inspector of
Taxes of the Netherlands Antilles certifying the payee's residency.
Controversy immediately erupted. Revenue Procedure 79-40
clearly exceeded the requirements of Treasury Regulation Section
1. 1441-6 by requiring the submission of certain certificates of status
as a condition for exemption from the withholding requirements of
sections 1441 and 1442.1 4  Furthermore, the revenue procedure re-
quired persons receiving interest from a Netherlands Antilles corpo-
ration to disclose certain information as a condition for issuing a ruling
that the interest payments were exempt from withholding. " 5  An
opinion issued by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on January
19, 1979 stated that Treasury Regulation Section 1.441-6 did not
preclude the IRS from requiring the certificates of status if exemptions
from withholding tax on interest paid to a Netherlands Antilles cor-
poration were claimed. Additionally, the opinion stated that in certain
cases a ruling would be necessary to obtain the exemption from with-
holding of tax from interest payments made to a Netherlands Antilles
corporation, and the information requested for ruling purposes should
I 1l. To qualify for the withholding tax exemption for interest paid pursuant to a United
States treaty provision the recipient of the interest must file an Ownership. Exemption, or
Reduced Rate Certificate (Form 1001) with the withholding agent. The certificate is effective
for a three year period provided the recipient remains eligible for the exemption during that
period. Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-6(c) (1971).
112. See supra note 109.
113. Rev. Proc. 79-40, 1979-2 C.B. 504.
114. Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-6(c)(1) only requires filing Form 1001 (Ownership, Ex-
emptions or Reduced Rate Certificate).
115. Rev. Proc. 79-40. 1979-2 C.B. 505-06.
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coincide with the requirements of the protocol. 116
Since 1974, the IRS has refused to issue private letter rulings
concerning offshore finance subsidiaries. I" Moreover, it announced
that it was not bound by any private letter ruling previously issued, 118
although it did confirm an unpublished 1973 private letter ruling
stating that interest paid by a Netherlands Antilles finance subsidiary
to non-United States persons was exempt from taxation. "19 While
the IRS no longer issues such private letter rulings, private law firms
issue opinion letters on this subject with regularity. 120
At the same time that the Treasury Department has been trying
to close the Netherlands Antilles "loophole" to businesses, the Fed-
eral National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), a government
agency, has been trying to take advantage of the tax benefits of the
treaty.' 21  Fannie Mae formed a Netherlands Antilles corporation,
FNM Overseas Capital Corp., N.V., which in 1978 purchased "fully-
modified pass-through" mortgage-backed certificates. 22  Revenue
Ruling 79-251 held that the interest paid to the Netherlands Antilles
corporation was exempt from federal taxation pursuant to article VIII(I)
of the treaty. 23 In 1983, Fannie Mae wanted to use its offshore
corporation to attract foreign funds to the United States mortgage
market. In a letter from Secretary of the Treasury Donald T. Regan
to Fannie Mae Chairman David 0. Maxwell, the request was denied
on the grounds that it might adversely affect treaty negotiations. 124
Treaty negotiations between the United States and the Netherlands
Antilles have been going on for a protracted length of time without
result. The United States wants to renegotiate or cancel the treaty as
it did with the British Virgin Islands. 25  The Netherlands Antilles
116. 26 C.F.R. § 505.301 (1983).
117. See supra note 100.
118. Id.
119. 1980 FED. TAXES (P-H) [ 4949 (80)] (this private letter ruling refers to the letter
ruling from Aug. 13, 1973 t$ 41,861 (73)]).
120. Fialka. supra note 107, at 14, col. 2.
121. Rev. Rul. 79-251, 1979-2 C.B. 271.
122. Id. at 272.
123. Id. at 273.
124. Letter from Secretary of the Treasury Donald T. Regan to Fannie Mae Chairman
David 0. Maxwell (Mar. 9, 1983), reprinted in 11983] DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 83, at
G-6, G-7.
125. [1983] DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 72, at G-6. Article XXIV of the British
Virgin Islands tax treaty provided for termination by either party giving notice on or before
June 30 of any year to become effective on January I of the following year. Convention
on Double Taxation, Apr. 16, 1945, United States-United Kingdom, art. XXIV, 60 Stat.
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wants to retain the treaty because it has become increasingly dependent
on the $50 to $100 million in annual tax revenues from offshore
finance subsidiaries. 126
The IRS has alleged widespread abuse of the treaty. 127  The 1963
Protocol did not end third party abuse of the treaty provisions, in-
cluding the practice of setting up a Netherlands Antilles corporation
to make investments in the United States. 28  The treaty, in combi-
nation with bank secrecy laws and lack of cooperation by Netherlands
Antilles officials, allows the laundering of funds earned through illegal
activities, and provides opportunities for tax evasion. 29  IRS officials
have stated that the Treasury Department will not hesitate to cancel
the treaty unless it is modified to prevent treaty shopping by third
parties and to provide better information exchange provisions. 13 0
The Netherlands Antilles complains of the limited, tax-oriented
view taken by the Treasury and insists that the treaty be reviewed as
a matter of foreign policy. 13 Cancellation of the treaty may result
in economic disaster and social unrest in both the Netherlands Antilles
and the United States. 132  Furthermore, the Netherlands Antilles
charges that the Treasury Department's position is inconsistent with
President Reagan's Caribbean Basin Incentive. 133
Cancellation of the treaty would cause serious financial problems
in the Eurobond market. Imposition of the thirty percent withholding
tax on cancellation of the treaty would drive up the cost of borrowing
money by increasing interest rates. This cost would have to be ab-
sorbed by the borrower. Some United States corporations are re-
quiring escape clauses in debt issues to allow for immediate refi-
nancing in case the treaty is either cancelled or substantially modified
1377, T.I.A.S. No. 1546, extended to British Virgin Islands by Second Protocol, May 25,
1954, T.I.A.S. No. 3165, and modified by Third Protocol, Aug. 19, 1957, T.I.A.S. No.
4124. The treaty was terminated by the United States on June 30, 1982 effective January
1, 1983. [19831 FED. TAXES (P-H) 42,911.
126. Statement of Harold Henriquez, Minister Plenipotentiary for Netherlands Antilles
affairs, [1983] DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 45, at G-7.
127. Testimony of Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, John E. Chapoton before the
House Government Affairs, Commerce, Consumer and Monetary Affairs Subcomm., Apr.
13, 1983, reprinted in 11983] DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 72, at G-6; 11983] DAILY TAX
REP. (BNA) No. 45, at G-7; [1983] DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 71, at G-5.
128. [1983] DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 71, at G-5.
129. See Testimony of John E. Chapoton, supra note 127, at G-6.
130. Id.
131. Statement of Harold Henriquez, supra note 126, at G-7.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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in a way which threatens to increase the interest rate.134  The treaty's
cancellation or modification must be done in such a way as to lessen
the economic and social impact in both the Netherlands Antilles and
the United States. If the treaty is cancelled, one alternative is to
"grandfather" all outstanding debt until maturity and provide benefits
to the Netherlands Antilles under the Caribbean Basin Incentives
proposal. Modification of the treaty to provide for greater information
flow and restrictions on usage by third parties could leave the offshore
finance subsidiary scheme intact without harming the economy of the
Netherlands Antilles.
Repeal of the thirty percent withholding tax for interest paid on
Eurobonds would accomplish the same tax result with respect to
United States corporations, and would allow direct access to the
Eurobond market without the need for an offshore finance subsidiary.
The Treasury Department is in favor of repealing the thirty percent
withholding tax on Eurobond interest paid by United States corpo-
rations, and bills to repeal the withholding tax have been introduced
in both the Senate and House of Representatives. 135  However, repeal
would divert more than $100 million from the Netherlands Antilles
treasury to the United States treasury and seriously disrupt the econ-
omy of the Netherlands Antilles. Furthermore, repeal of the thirty
percent withholding tax on interest paid by United States corporations
on Eurobond debt could be embarrassing to an Administration that
has insisted on a domestic withholding tax on interest paid. 13 6 How-
ever, repeal of domestic withholding rules would make the repeal of
the withholding tax on Eurobond issues more palatable. 137
V. CONCLUSION
Today the size of the Eurobond market for debt issued by United
States corporations is roughly equal to the size of the domestic market.
Moreover, the cost of financing debt in the Eurobond market is lower
134. [1983] DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 43, at G-3 and G-4.
135. H.R. 3025, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 1557, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
The Reagan Adminstration is reportedly in favor of repeal of the thirty percent 'vithholding
on interest. Letter from Assistant Secretary of the Treasury John E. Chapoton to Repre-
sentative Sam M. Gibbons, reprinted in [1983] DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 108, at G-5
and G-6.
136. I.R.C. § 3451 (repealed in 1983), reenacted as section 301; Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982. This provision was never put into effect due to heavy pressure
from the banking industry.
137. H.R. 2973, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983), signed by President Reagan on August
5, 1983.
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than the cost in the domestic market. However, the attractiveness of
the Eurobond market is marred by the threat of unilateral regulation
of that market by either the Securities and Exchange Commission or
the Internal Revenue Service, or both.
The Securities and Exchange Commission should clarify its po-
sition with respect to the secondary market of Eurobonds in the United
States, resolve the doubts, and allay the fears of issuers, underwriters,
and sellers with respect to potential liability under United States se-
curities laws. The Treasury should seek modification of the United
States-Netherlands Antilles treaty in such a way as to preserve the
economic and social status quo in the Netherlands Antilles and to
preserve the viability of the Eurobond market. Cancellation of the
treaty, if it cannot be satisfactorily modified, should be coupled not
only with the repeal of the thirty percent withholding tax on Eurobond
interest paid by United States corporations, but also with aid to the
Netherlands Antilles, either directly, or through the Caribbean Basin
Incentives program.
Policy makers must realize that corporate finance is international
finance and that international finance should not be frustrated by the
regulatory scheme of any state, particularly if that scheme is not
subscribed to by other participating states. The United States is a
part of the international financial community and must be a responsible
member of that community.
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